Archive for the ‘Unisys Stealth’ Category

If you want the full financial and operational value of Cloud Computing, then you want to use a public cloud. The advantages over private clouds include:

  • Low upfront costs.
  • Clear relationship between cost and benefit with pay-for-use model.
  • Easy to try new projects, easy to make change.
  • Flexible.
  • A wide choice of Service Level Agreement choices (SLAs).
  • Easy to provide a world-wide presence.

Of course, there are some public cloud disadvantages, the most critical being security, performance and availability. At this point in time, you can easily meet most performance and availability requirements from a variety of CSPs; security is more difficult. In a public cloud environment, you do not control physical access, and you have no control over who is sharing common infrastructure including networks, server hardware, and storage systems. But there is a way to secure your data both between your facility and your public cloud CSP and within the CSP’s infrastructure: combine Unisys Stealth with Amazon Web Services (AWS).

The basic principle behind Stealth is to only allow a device to communicate with another device if they share a Community of Interest, a COI.  A COI is nothing more than a group of people and servers.  Data can be shared freely within a COI, but must not be shared with any person or server not in the COI.  In the usual Stealth installation, a user’s COI or set of COIs is specified in the site’s identity management system, the system that is used to authenticate a user when the user signs on.

If you are responsible for protecting your company’s proprietary information, your customers’ private information, or concerned with compliance you should at least look at Unisys Stealth. If you are responsible for a government database involving individuals’ information or classified data, you should also be looking at Unisys Stealth.

I have talked about Unisys Stealth before, Amazon Secure Storage Service (Amazon S3), and the combination in “Secure Public Cloud” back in 2013. What has changed are some significant “under the covers” enhancements to Unisys Stealth, the incorporation of Stealth into the AWS Marketplace, and additional operational facilities to enable you to easily extend your datacenter into the AWS cloud to handle expected, or unexpected, sudden increases in resource demand.

The combination protects communication between your AWS virtual servers even within the same physical server, encrypts all communication among the servers in your data center and the servers in the AWS cloud, and controls access based on roles. You control the security access policies that define who and what can communicate, allowing you to isolate applications within your environment for business or compliance reasons.

Stealth subscriptions are sold through the AWS Marketplace; you get one bill from Amazon for everything including Stealth. It is available in every AWS region. Suddenly you can open a presence anywhere quickly and inexpensively, and react to unexpected growth from anywhere.

One of the most important characteristics of Unisys Stealth and AWS is that there is no back door. Unisys, Amazon, and any network component between do not have your encryption keys. Your government cannot force Unisys or Amazon to provide access to your data; they do not have a way to break in. Even if you are OK with your government gaining access to your information at any time without providing notice to you, you should be very concerned. If your government can get in, then so can any other government, cybercriminal or cyberterrorist by using the same back door for access. Another important benefit of Stealth is that even if a cybercriminal as able to insert malware on one of your servers in the AWS cloud, that server would not be able to transmit anything back to the cybercriminals because Stealth will prevent your server from communicating to any device that is not part of a community of interest that you have defined.

The last word:

Unisys has been around since 1886, and is one of the few survivors of the initial computer revolution designing and building commercial and government computers since the 1940s, computer systems that continue to perform “bet the business” functions. Support is a key element of that environment, and no matter how big or small your company is, you still get that enterprise level support from Unisys. Sure, Unisys has the on-line self-help site with all of the technical documentation and discussion you might want, but you can always pick up the phone and talk to a real person who is knowledgeable on the product, and is probably located within one or two time zones of you.

Curious? Check it out with a Unisys AWS test drive.

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WS2003Windows Server 2003 (WS2003) was first released in, surprise, 2003. It replaced Windows Server 2000. Microsoft has released several derivatives including Windows Compute Cluster Server 2003, Windows Storage Server 2003, Windows Small Business Server 2003, Windows Home Server, and Windows Server 2003 for Embedded Systems.

WS2003 mainstream support ended in July 2010. On July 14, 2015, Microsoft will officially end extended support for WS2003. Microsoft will not release any updates, including security updates or patches, after this date.  At that point you can pay Microsoft for security fixes for WS2003, but it is very expensive and not delivered promptly. Most antivirus solutions will not be supported on WS2003 after 7/14/2015 meaning that there will be no signature updates for new vulnerabilities. Considering the rate at which new malware opportunities are discovered in all flavors of Windows platforms, any WS2003 systems you have in production will quickly become vulnerable. As one data point, there were 37 critical updates for WS2003 in 2013, 10 years after the product’s release. WS2003 will not pass any further security or compliance audits. Expect stiffer fines and other penalties if you experience a data breach where a WS2003 system is part of the application environment.

This should not be a surprise. Microsoft has published its support policy and product end of life chart on its web site for over ten years. There are a lot of servers still running WS2003 out there. A Microsoft survey in January 2014 showed about 22 million WS2003 systems in use. A large number of those are in small and medium sized businesses. Many of these SMB companies do not have large IT staffs or budget to make any kind of a migration.   There are probably at least 10 million WS2003 systems still in use today. Even many Fortune 500 companies are still dependent on WS2003, and most will not have migrated by the deadline, especially as it seems to take about six months to make the migration off WS2003.

Microsoft introduced Windows Server 2008 in 2008 as the successor product to WS2003. However, Windows Server 2008 is not the best destination for your WS2003 systems. Microsoft will end mainstream support for Windows Server 2008 on the same day that it ends all support for Windows Server 2003, July 14, 2015, while extended support ends in January 2020. If you need to move off Windows Server 2003 in any of its flavors, you are better served to jump to Windows Server 12. Windows Server 12 was generally available in September 2012 and released R2 in October 2013. Mainstream support for Windows Server 12 is scheduled to run until January 2018.

Microsoft provides assistance. Perhaps as an indication of their sense of urgency, the first thing you see on that Microsoft page is a count down clock telling you, down to the second, how long you have. Microsoft is, not surprisingly, pushing migration of your WS2003 servers to the cloud powered by Microsoft Azure. In some cases, that may make sense, but only if you want to make a significant change in your operations and procedures. Moving to the Cloud should be a business decision, not a technology decision. Like a lot of things involving cloud computing, the end point is often a better place to be, but getting there under a deadline can be risky. You should at least look at the material Microsoft provides to help in discovering which of your applications and workloads are running on WS2003, assess those applications and workloads by type, importance, and complexity, and choose a migration destination for each. For some of those workloads and applications, moving them to the Cloud may be the easier and less risky solution.

Your IT department probably has some good reasons for not migrating:

  • Your current server hardware may not support Windows Server 12.
  • Some of your mission-critical applications may not be supported on Windows Server 12.
  • You do not have sufficient financial or IT resources to make the migration while simultaneously keeping your IT environment running.
  • Unfamiliarity with Windows Server 2012.

The second may be the most serious, and may take the longest to fix. In the worst case, you may need to migrate to a different application.

In the meantime you may be able to mitigate some of the risk by restricting access to your WS2003 servers. Products like the Unisys Stealth Solution may help. It can completely isolate your WS2003 systems from the outside world, allowing communication only from the specific systems and users you permit. Since the protection is based on user identity, not specific network location or device identity, the rights of an individual change automatically when their role changes. As Unisys says, “You can’t hack what you can’t see.”

If you do not have the resources, get help. There are many companies out there with experience in migrating off WS2003. You do not have to go it alone.

The last word:

Windows Server 2003 is potentially as serious a security problem as Windows XP. Hopefully you are well past getting rid of that OS from your entire IT environment as have all of your business partners who share any proprietary, financial or customer protected data.

If you are running Windows Server 2008 you should start planning to move them to Windows server 12.

The keys to a successful operating system migration are planning and testing. These exercises can feel like a huge drain on your resources, and each migration can itself cause new problems. But you have to do it; you cannot afford to be vulnerable.

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Last time I wrote about The Need to Protect Healthcare Data, or perhaps more importantly the potential cost of not protecting it. This time I want to talk about how to do that in a non-disruptive way that will probably save your organization money while significantly reducing the chances of a major data breach involving hundreds or thousands of patient records.   Of course the same approach can be used to protect any kind of protected information from exiting en masse in any line of business.

The key is to protect the “crown jewels” – the database that contains the data that must be protected. Normally, these systems are implemented as three-tier environments. To keep the picture and words simple, in this discussion each tier has only one server but in a real implementation each tier is usually composed of multiple servers for redundancy or to provide the necessary performance.

  • The data tier contains the database server that actually contains the database. This server contains the software that manages all access to the data: no one can access the data without eventually getting to the database server.
  • The application tier that controls the business logic that uses the database. These are the programs that implement information retrieval and update for the medical staff, capture information from medical device controllers, and handle data retrieval for meaningful use and billing.
  • The presentation tier is what interfaces with the user or another application system. It is often implemented as web services so that any device with a web browser can access the same information.

For example, when a doctor needs to see a patients chart from her tablet, she can use a browser or a special tablet application to ask for the current chart for “John Smith DOB 04/23/1945.” The tablet browser or application sends that request to the presentation tier, where the doctor is authenticated if necessary, then sends that request to the application tier. There a program formats a query against the database and sends it to the data tier. The data tier retrieves the information and sends it back to the application tier, who formats the specific information for the chart and sends that to the presentation tier. The presentation tier then sends it to the tablet browser or application for display to the doctor.

While this may seem like a complicated process, it nicely separates the operation so that, for example, a different kind of user device with completely different display characteristics can be easily added by changing only the presentation tier, and usually just making a single change that will work independent of the specific kind of transaction. Similarly, it allows the application layer to perform additional validation on a specific transaction, such as verifying that the doctor is permitted by HIPAA to see John Smith’s information.

The purpose of this requirement is to limit access to the application and data tiers to only those specific devices that have a valid need to access those tiers. In particular, only the servers in the application tier should be allowed to access the servers in the data tier, and only the servers in the presentation and data tiers should be allowed to access the servers in the application tier. There are, of course, users called administrators that require access directly to the application and data tier servers. These are the people who are responsible for the management and operation of the applications and database. In most organizations, there are just a few database administrators and application administrators who must have direct access into those servers.

This solution described there uses the Unisys Stealth Solution. Stealth uses state-of-the-art encryption, but the key principle behind Stealth is that it only allows a device to communicate with another device if they share a Community of Interest, a COI. A COI is nothing more than a group of people and servers. Data can be shared freely within a COI, but must not be shared with any person or server not in the COI. In the usual Stealth installation, a user’s COI or set of COIs is specified in the site’s identity management system, the system that is used to authenticate a user when the user signs on. If some device tries to access a Stealth-protected server or workstation without belonging to the same COI, then the Stealth-protected device is completely invisible; the Stealth-protected device simply will not respond to anything from that device.


The picture represents each tier by a single server and shows one database and application administrator. As stated before, there are usually multiple of each. The red lines show the communications paths protected by Stealth. The black line represents clear-text traffic coming from the organizations internal network or over the Internet. The Internet traffic should already be protected by some form of encryption such as IPsec or SSL. There are three Communities of Interest (COIs) in the diagram. The green dots represent devices in the DB COI, the blue dots represent devices in the Application COI, and the yellow dots represent devices in the DB Administrator COI. Only the database Administrator and the application tier server can access the data tier server. Only the data tier server, application administrator, and presentation tier server can access the application tier server. Any other device attempting to access the data or application tier servers would be completely ignored.

Since the individual administrator’s COI is determined at log on time, it does not matter which workstation an administrator uses. When an individual signs on with a database administrator’s credentials, he now has the DB ADMIN COI and can access the data tier server.

One Stealth implementation can protect multiple databases that are in the same network segment, i.e., are visible from each other in the network. Otherwise you can replicate the Stealth implementation as needed.

This solution has no impact on existing applications and is invisible to end-users and even to the database and application administrators. Capital savings come from not requiring as much network infrastructure such as firewalls. Operational savings come from not needing to reconfigure firewalls or other network security devices and applications. If an administrator is added or moves on, simply change your identity management system. Stealth then automatically permits or prevents the individual from accessing the database or application servers.

If you do not have a tiered implementation or have collapsed the tiers onto a single server, and therefore allow end users to directly access the server containing the database then this mechanism does not help. Then again, not much would be able to help in this situation. You first need to separate your environment into multiple tiers so that any security solution can control access to the database and application servers.

The last word:

This mechanism does not protect against the accidental or deliberate loss caused by inappropriate actions of individuals who are authorized to access the data. This includes the file clerk who walks away from a logged-on workstation in a semi-public area, or the doctor who foolishly loads a couple of patient files on her son’s laptop at home. There are ways to reduce the chances of these kinds of incidents, and in super-sensitive environments it makes sense to make those investments. But they are very expensive and usually not worth the cost. While these errors are regrettable they rarely lead to fines or the risk of losing accreditation, or the CIO needing to find a new job.

As always, the key is to have a good security policy document and provide annual security training emphasizing to employees and contractors that you are serious about data security.

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In spite of the significant service and financial advantages of the Cloud, many companies and governments are increasingly reluctant to adopt it for their critical processing. This reluctance is not caused by security considerations regarding the basic technology of the Cloud; those issues have been largely resolved. Companies following best security practices with experienced Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) can have Cloud solutions with security matching or exceeding anything they could do internally.

What is causing this crisis of confidence is the US National Security Agency (NSA). We have seen almost weekly revelations about the unconstitutional collection of personal and corporate data by the NSA, accompanied by their lack of internal security that has allowed thousands of documents to be “lost,” including those released by Ed Snowden.

It is not just NSA. The British GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters) is also tapping Internet communication. One British MP, Chi Onwurah, in “reluctantly and unhappily moving to the Cloud.” One reason is the US Patriot Act which essentially means that any data stored in the Cloud that ends up on American servers can be compromised by the US Government at any time without notice. Some countries have privacy laws requiring information be stored within the country. Companies in those countries have a problem with public cloud providers that have servers in multiple countries. That flexibility is great for reliability and business continuance, but a nightmare to establish and verify compliance.

All of this impacts revenue opportunities for American CSPs and the growth of the Cloud in general. But there is more.

from Glen Greenwald’s "No Place to Hide"

from Glen Greenwald’s “No Place to Hide”

In a letter on May 15, John Chambers, the CEO of Cisco Systems, asked President Obama to restrict the surveillance activities of the NSA. Cisco Systems is one of the major suppliers of the network hardware that creates and manages the infrastructure that is the Internet, with over 50% of the worldwide market by revenue. The cause of this letter was newly released revelations allegedly showing that NSA intercepted, en-route, equipment from Cisco and other manufacturers to their customers worldwide and installed NSA surveillance software. Mr. Chambers indicated that Cisco did not cooperate with NSA in this activity nor was Cisco aware of NSA interceptions.

If the allegation of NSA interference is true, or even believed to be true, it will impact the ability of Cisco and other US manufacturers to sell their equipment in the US or anywhere in the world.

NSA has been fairly consistent: anytime they have denied doing something it turns out later that they in fact were doing it. I’m not sure how President Obama can convince companies that he has “fixed the problem.”

What should you do? The Cloud still does provide significant value, but you need to control the security of your own data yourself. Use state-of-the-art encryption for both data-in-motion (data moving through the Internet) and data-at-rest (data stored in the Cloud), and make sure you control the encryption keys for the data-at-rest. I discuss one way to get a Secure Public Cloud in an earlier post.

The last word:

Depending on which version is more accurate, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was in US custody at Camp Bucca, a US-controlled detention facility in Iraq, for most of 2004 or from 2005-2009. In any case, he was given an “unconditional release” into Iraq under President George W. Bush. You may have recently heard of him: he is now the leader of ISIS, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, which is running rampant over northern Syria and threatening the existence of Iraq. In hindsight, it was probably a mistake to release him.

More recently, President Obama decided to release five senior Taliban commanders from Guantanamo prison to a life of luxury in Qatar, with full freedom of movement within the country, and able to go anywhere after one year. The manner of the release was in stark violation to a law President Obama signed requiring that he notify Congress at least 30 days prior to any such release; he notified a few members of Congress five hours before the transfer. Noorullah Noori, one of the five, has already vowed to continue fighting Americans.

In return, he obtained the release of Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl. As President Obama said, we do have an obligation to not leave our military personnel behind. The controversy, mostly in the press, that Sgt. Bergdahl may have deserted his post back in 2009 is irrelevant to the requirement to bring him home. If there is significant evidence, Sgt. Bergdahl will be court marshaled and, if found guilty, punished. That trial and punishment, if appropriate, must happen under US control, not Taliban control.

In a few years, will we wonder about the wisdom of President Obama’s method of getting Sgt. Bergdahl free?

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Well, not really.

Microsoft released Windows XP in August of 2001 as its personal computer operating system within the Windows NT family of operating systems. As late as October 2010, you could still buy a new PC with Windows XP installed. Windows XP was the most widely used operating system until August 2012, when Windows 7 overtook it. Mainstream support ended in April of 2009, and extended support ended on April 8, 2014. The last stable release was in April 2008. Going forward, it will cost customers on the order of $200 per PC per year to maintain security patches.

There have been a lot of security patches for Windows XP. The phrase “Patch Tuesday” refers to the second Tuesday of each month in North America, when Microsoft issues its planned security updates. Of course, sometimes there is an extraordinary Patch Tuesday fourteen days after a scheduled Patch Tuesday, plus critical patches in between. There were 99 security flaws detected in Windows XP in 2013. I would not expect the need for frequent security patches for Windows XP to diminish at all.

PCMarketShareBut Windows XP is not dead, and is not going to disappear for a long time. As of March 2014, NetMarketShare reported that Windows XP still had over one quarter of the desktop operating system market share. That represents on the order of 500 million computers worldwide.

The simple solution is for people to move off Windows XP. For some people, that is conceptually easy:

  1. Buy a new PC (your old one probably won’t support Windows 7 or Windows 8).
  2. Move all of your applications and files to the new PC.
  3. Deal with the applications that need updating, including Microsoft Office, or find replacements for those who just won’t run at all on the new OS.

There are a lot of proprietary software products that just will not run on anything but Windows XP. Some amusing examples:

  • 95% of all ATMs in the world. Yes, the bank teller machine that gives you money is probably running Windows XP, and probably communicates back to the branch or service provider over the Internet.
  • Cash registers and other POS (point of sale) devices, many of which are using wireless technology to communicate back to the server.
  • SCADA systems (supervisory control and data acquisition). These systems allow remote control and data acquisition for environments like manufacturing, power generation and distribution, and water and sewer management including dams. Again, they are often running over the Internet.
  • Industrial robots
  • Slot machines.

These systems are all prime targets of cyber-criminals and cyber-terrorists.

There actually is a solution for many XP environments: the Unisys Stealth Solution. It can completely isolate your XP systems from the outside world, allowing communication only from the specific systems and users you permit. Since the protection is based on user identity, not specific network location or device identity, the rights of an individual change automatically when their role changes. As Unisys says, “You can’t hack what you can’t see.”

The last word:

This is serious. If your company is relying on Windows XP you are much more exposed to attack now then you were last month. What is worse, your exposure is not just from your own systems, but the systems used by your partners and employees when they work remotely. Have you asked your CIO how many XP systems are still in use in your extended IT infrastructure? Has your CIO checked with your partners? What about your POS equipment or the factory robots used to make the products you sell?

Your first step should be to determine what you really have, and make a plan to fix the problems. It may literally take years to eliminate all of the issues, so you will need to have mitigation efforts in place in the meantime.

You should have done this at least five years ago, but if you didn’t, now is the time to act.

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The definition of Cloud Computing that I use most often is from NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology, formerly the National Bureau of Standard, and part of the United States Department of Commerce):

Cloud computing is a pay-for-use model for enabling available, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.

The key characteristics of the Cloud are:

  • On-demand self-service
  • Ubiquitous network access
  • Location-independent resource pooling
  • Rapid elasticity
  • Pay-for-use

We all know that a Public Cloud is the most economically beneficial.  It is the closest to this definition of the Cloud.  However, many IT and Security executives are concerned about the security of a Public Cloud.  Your network traffic and data are sharing the same physical infrastructure with dozens, hundreds or even thousands of other organizations.  This includes networks, storage and servers which impacts the security of your data-in-motion, data-at-rest, and data-in-process.

Almost two years ago I wrote about Amazon S3.  Amazon Simple Storage Service provides a simple web service interface to store and retrieve any amount of data in the Cloud.  Amazon S3 meets all of the characteristics of Cloud Computing including access from anywhere, pay for use, and rapid elasticity.  More importantly for this topic, it provides significant security capabilities including IAM (identify and access management) policies, access control lists, and query string authentication.  The later is critical for controlling access to data – a common way to steal data is to manipulate the question being asked of the data so that instead of returning just one piece of information it returns thousands of pieces of data.  Amazon S3 also supports several alternatives for data encryption, including allowing you to control the encryption keys.

I also have written about the Unisys Stealth Solution for Network, a game-changing product to protect data-in-motion.  Stealth provides defense-level encryption and authentication.  More importantly, it automatically enforces communities of interest (COI).  A COI is a group of users who need to share data within the group but not within anyone outside of the group.  With Stealth, servers and workstations are completely invisible to anyone not belonging to the same COI.  This cloaking also prevents many data-in-process attacks from stealing your data.  Attacks like keystroke monitoring, screen scraping, and RAM skimmers require a way to transmit the captured data to the cybercriminal.  Stealth significantly reduces the opportunities of such malware getting onto your servers and workstations, and prevents those outgoing transmissions.

Unisys recently announced that Stealth is available for Amazon Web Services (AWS).  Amazon AWS, Amazon S3, and Unisys Stealth provide a Public Cloud platform that provides real security for data-in-motion and data-at-rest, with all of the keys controlled by you, not by Amazon or any other third party.  Even an accidental or deliberate attack on Amazon by an employee, contractor, or government agency will not be able to intercept or look at your data without coming to you for the keys.

The last word:

About 20 years ago, a friend described Unisys as a computer hardware and software company whose technology supported its services offering.  In the late 1980’s Unisys was the fourth largest software company in the world as determined by software sales revenue.  Unfortunately, Unisys senior management never seemed to understand this.  Most thought of Unisys as a services company that, incidentally, produced some product stuff.

Ed Coleman has been the CEO of Unisys for the past five years.  He may actually understand.  In a recent Computerworld interview, Coleman describes the new software-focused data center strategy and powerful new security technology focus for Unisys.  That “new security technology” is Unisys Stealth.  It will get very exciting if the rest of Unisys gets the same message.

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